31 Theses on the Syrian War.

May 16, 2018
  1. The Syrian war arose out of the “Arab Spring”, which was an attempt by the United States government to remodel the Middle East in its own interests through destabilisation and other kinds of political pressure rather than pure aggression as in the earlier Iraqi war.
  2. The agenda of the “Arab Spring” was to bring all Arab countries under a Sunni-corporate regime, discourage democracy, and ultimately mobilise Arab governments into an anti-Iranian front headed by Saudi Arabia and (implicitly) Israel.
  3. The need to focus Qatari, Saudi and NATO aggression against Libya in order to prevent the Libyan government from defeating the Qatari/Saudi/NATO-funded Wahhabi insurgents meant that the attack on Syria had to be delayed.
  4. The delay meant that the Syrian government was able to see what the Qatari/Saudi/NATO coalition intended for the countries which they overthrew in the bloody chaos which followed the Wahhabi takeover in Libya.
  5. Since the Syrian government understood that this chaos was what the American and Gulf fomentors of the “Arab Spring” sought for them, and since as nationalists and secularists they were opposed both to imperialist control and to Islamic fundamentalism, especially of the Wahhabi sort, they suppressed all signs of a nascent uprising extremely brutally.
  6. The Syrian spy services were extremely incompetent in failing to identify the impending Wahhabi guerrilla war, and may have compounded their blunder by attempting to promote Islamic fundamentalism as a supposed counterweight to the American-sponsored “liberal” movement supposedly inspired by the “Arab Spring”; meanwhile, the Syrian armed forces were notably incompetent in resisting the initial incursions of guerrillas.
  7. In the initial stages of the war at least, there was substantial (if not overwhelming) support for the insurgents among the population (at least certain segments of a very divided population).
  8. Given that the Ba’ath Party espoused a one-party state led by a family of dictators surrounded by a narrow cabal of supporters, and strictly censored all political debate and suppressed all opposition by violence, it is natural that some people would feel that anything would be better than this.
  9. In a dictatorial context, people tend to be quite ignorant of what is going on around them and are easily convinced that if the Party said something, then the opposite of that had to be true; it is thus the responsibility of the opposition to the dictatorship to provide reliable and relevant information.
  10. The uprising in Syria was clearly endorsed by the United States for its own purposes (meaning that supporting the uprising meant supporting U.S. imperialism) and was sponsored by the Wahhabi regimes in Saudi Arabia and Qatar (meaning that supporting the uprising entailed supporting the Wahhabi Sunni movement).
  11. Therefore, although the popular support for the Syrian uprising was understandable, the leaders of the uprising knew that they were serving the interests, not of Syrians, but of the American government and the dictators of the Gulf states, and deliberately deceived their people into believing that the uprising had any merit for Syrians themselves.
  12. The deception carried out by the ostensible leaders of the Syrian “revolution” and the “Free Syrian Army” must have been because they hoped for preferment in any future government even though few of them were Wahhabi, or because they had been bought off by American or Gulf agents.
  13. Although the ostensible leaders of the Syrian uprising, many of whom had once been trusted by the Syrian people, were traitors to Syria and were culpable in the crimes committed against Syria in the name of the insurgency, the most culpable people of all are the Western liberals and leftists who promoted the Syrian uprising as if it were indigenous to Syria, and provided cover for the American and Gulf agents and the odious forces which they supported in Syria.
  14. The Turkish and American involvement in the Syrian war, while substantial, was committed to more limited goals than the Saudi and Qatari involvement, because in the end the Turks and Americans were not ideologically committed, but were fundamentally concerned with their national interests as they perceived them.
  15. The failure of the Syrian uprising to overthrow the government by 2013 seems to have made the Obama administration doubt that the Saudi and Qatari methods would bring a successful result, and therefore the attempt was made to legitimate a US bombing campaign against Syria — which was presumably intended to so degrade the Syrian armed forces as to make the insurgents win — through claims that the Syrian government was using chemical warfare.
  16. The Russian concern about the ultimate destruction of its minor naval base in Syria, but also the Russian desire for a diplomatic coup, encouraged Russia to involve itself diplomatically and militarily in support of the prevention of a US bombing campaign by enlisting the UN to support the destruction of the Syrian chemical warfare capacity, which provided the US with the appearance of a diplomatic “victory” and thus compensated for the failure of the attempt to justify aggression.
  17. The Russian diplomatic success in Syria encouraged closer ties between Russia and Syria, but also, because the Russians encouraged the Chinese to involve themselves in diplomatic activity in the anti-chemical-warfare project, encouraged closer ties between China and Syria and between Russia and China, which also further encouraged Iranian engagement with Syria.
  18. The US encouragement of a coup against the Ukrainian government in order to install an anti-Russian regime had been in progress for several years, but it is possible that the Russian diplomatic success in Syria encouraged the US to advance the timetable of the coup and thus make it more chaotic, possibly also promoting the Russian fears which led to the seizure of the Crimea, and thus the provocation of the secession of the Donbass, which in turn promoted the direct US attack on Russia.
  19. It is also possible that the Saudi/Qatari support for a Wahhabi movement in Iraq to overthrow the Shi’ite Iraqi government or at least seize control of a large part of Iraqi territory, and thus open yet another front in the Syrian war into the bargain, was in part a US response to the Russo-Chinese intervention which had stymied direct aggression against Syria.
  20. The establishment of the “Islamic State” movement in Syria and Iraq provided a fresh source of recruits for the insurgency and severely overextended the Syrian armed forces, bringing them, after almost five years of fighting, to the verge of breakdown, but its genocidal brutality and cultural destructiveness also made it clear, yet again, what the real agenda of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States was.
  21. The behaviour of the “Islamic State” was intended to legitimate the US intervention supposedly (but not actually) in opposition to it, but this also provided justifications for the Russian government to intervene.
  22. The Russian intervention, associated as it was with an expanded Lebanese intervention and a substantial Iranian intervention, was not only legal in terms of international law and custom (unlike the US intervention, which amounted to invasion) but it was also much better planned and executed and had far greater prospect of success since it relied on enhancing the competence, equipment and morale.of the Syrian armed forces.
  23. The American ground invasion of Syria which followed the Russian intervention was tardy, inept and largely pointless given that it depended for its survival on sympathy from Turkey and Iraq which could not be guaranteed, especially not after Iraq had largely defeated the “Islamic State” and crushed the Kurdish attempt to take advantage of its temporary weakness.
  24. The Turkish shooting down of a Russian combat aircraft attacking Wahhabi insurgents on Syrian soil was almost certainly approved by the US.
  25. The Russian response to the Turkish attack on their armed forces was extraordinarily measured and suggests that Russian intelligence had realised that Turkey was the weakest link in the US-Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi-Qatari coalition against Syria, and that a combination of coercion and diplomacy might shift Turkish support away from the Wahhabi insurgents who had little in common with Turkish Islamism.
  26. The failed coup against the Turkish government which followed an apparent warming of relations between Russia and Turkey was organised on US soil and was probably carried out with the approval of the US government; in any case the Turkish government believed that this was the case and would have been foolish to believe otherwise, so this was a major factor in the shift of Turkish allegiance away from support from the Wahhabi insurgents in Syria.
  27. The Syrian victories against Wahhabi insurgents in Homs, Aleppo and Palmyra was met with an ineffectual series of bombings of Syrian and allied forces undertaken by the Israelis and the US which suggested that the US support for the insurgents had become incoherent, a notion buttressed by the election of Donald Trump as US President which flew in the face of US ruling-class support for Wahhabi-sponsored regime change in Damascus.
  28. Despite the much improved military situation for the Syrian government after its string of victories and despite the expanded contribution of Russian armed forces, intelligence agencies and diplomats in the region, the Syrian government did not show the overstretch and hubris which might have been expected from the past, but instead continued a methodical process of systematic expansion of territorial control without any dramatic actions against the insurgents.
  29. The US increasing reliance on Kurdish insurgents to protect their forces occupying Eastern Syria, naturally generated conflict with Turkey, which eventually led to the Turkish invasion of north-eastern Syria and the collapse of the Kurdish forces in the region — making it possible for an ultimate negotiated Syrian recovery of the region to take place should Turkey be willing to allow this.
  30. The success of the Syrian Ba’ath Party in resisting this level of aggression when virtually all other attempts at self-defence in the region have failed, is a strong suggestion that the Ba’ath Party is a legitimate organisation in Syria, and must form part of any future government.
  31. Given all the above points, not only does the initiative lie with the Syrians, but it does so justly, and all possible support should be offered to any initiative aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Syria and expelling all foreign invaders from that country, before any discussion of any constitutional changes takes place — and nobody involved in the Syrian insurgency should be viewed as an appropriate participant in any such discussion.

 

 

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